New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism

1. Introduction

Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn, and Duncan Pritchard

Part I: Situating Disjunctivism

2. Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality

John McDowell

3. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

Part II: Historical Antecedents

4. Ancient Philosophy and Disjunctivism: The Case of the Stoics

Iakovos Vasiliou

5. The Kantian Roots of Epistemological Disjunctivism

Thomas Lockhart

6. Was Wittgenstein a Disjunctivist avant la lettre?

Genia Schoenbaumsfield

7. Settling a Question: Austin and Disjunctivism

Guy Longworth

Part III: Epistemological Disjunctivism: Prospects and Problems

8. Disjunctivism and Realism - not Naive but Conceptual

Sonia Sedivy

9. Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments

Craig French

10. Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism

Veli Mitova

11. Neither/Nor

Clayton Littlejohn

12. Disjunctivism and Credence

Ram Neta

13. Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and the First Person

Adrian Haddock

Part IV: Disjunctivism in Other Domains

14. Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Joseph Milburn and Andrew Moon

15. Testimonial Disjunctivism

Stephen Wright

16. Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge

Dorit Bar-On and Dustin Johnson

17. Ringers for Belief

Casey Doyle

18. Disjunctivism and Other Minds

Anita Avramides

Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.

• A teoria psicológica e escolas de pensamento
• Epistemologia e teoria do conhecimento: Filosofia
• Filosofia da mente
• Ética e filosofia moral
• Filosofia ocidental, desde ~ 1900
• Percepção

Epistemological Disjunctivism;Speaker's Testimony;Casey Doyle;Parity Thesis;Joseph Milburn;Basic Mental;Duncan Pritchard;Perceptual Knowledge;Thomas Lockhart;Metaphysical Disjunctivism;Guy Longworth;Disjunctive Accounts;Dermot Moran;Perceptual Beliefs;Genia Schoenbaumsfeld;Epistemic Standing;Iakovos Vasilou;McDowell's View;Ram Neta;Rational Support;Adrian Haddock;Fallible Capacity;Clayton Littlejohn;Disjunctivist View;Sonia Sedivy;White Cup;John Turri;Reflective Access;Dorit Bar-On;Memory Knowledge;Stephen Wright;Factive Reasons;Andrew Moon;Conceptual Capacities;Craig French;Wider Issue;Veli Mitova;Conclusive Warrant;Anita Avramides;Cartesian Scepticism;epistemology;Normative Reasons;disjunctivism;Epistemically Grounded;Perceptual Capacities;knowledge;Motivating Reasons;Immanuel Kant;J.L. Austin;Edmund Husserl;Ludwig Wittgenstein;perceptual disjunctivism;radical skepticism;reasons for belief;testimonial knowledge;knowledge of other minds;self-knowledge;brain in a vat;propositional memory knowledge;truthy psychologism;categorial intuition;anti-luck virtue epistemology