Mao's Road to Power
-10%
portes grátis
Mao's Road to Power
Revolutionary Writings: Volume IX
Fewsmith, Joseph; Hearst, Nancy
Taylor & Francis Ltd
02/2023
594
Dura
Inglês
9781138856561
15 a 20 dias
1440
Descrição não disponível.
AUGUST 1945 PREPARE TO DEAL WITH THE CIVIL WAR SITUATION THAT IS CERTAIN TO ARISE (August 4, 1945) PREPARE TO JOIN WITH THE FORCES OF WANG ZHEN AND WANG SHOUDAO TO SET UP THE HUNAN-GUANGDONG BORDER BASE AREA (August 4, 1945) TELEGRAM TO MARSHAL STALIN (August 9, 1945) COMRADE MAO ZEDONG MAKES A DECLARATION REGARDING THE FACT THAT THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN HAS ENTERED ITS FINAL STAGE (August 9, 1945) SPEECH AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE SEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (August 9, 1945) THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTIONS REGARDING OUR PARTY'S TASKS AFTER JAPAN'S SURRENDER (August 11, 1945) XINHUA NEWS AGENCY REPORTER CRITICIZES AND CONDEMNS THE "CHIANG KAISHEK ORDER" FOR PROVOKING CIVIL WAR AND FOR DESTROYING WORLD PEACE (August 12, 1945) WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO SEIZE COMMUNICATIONS LINES AND THE CITIES ALONG THOSE LINES (August 12, 1945) REGARDING CENTRAL CHINA'S DEPLOYMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE CIVIL WAR (August 12, 1945) THE SITUATION FOLLOWING THE VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN AND OUR COURSE OF ACTION (August 13, 1945) TELEGRAM FROM COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ZHU [DE] AND DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF PENG [DEHUAI] RESOLUTELY REJECTING CHIANG KAISHEK'S ERRONEOUS ORDER (August 13, 1945) WE DEFINITELY MUST HAVE AN ABSOLUTELY SUPERIOR FORCE DURING CAMPAIGNS; WE CANNOT FIGHT RECKLESSLY (August 13, 1945) EXTENSIVELY OCCUPY THE COUNTRYSIDE, DO NOT FIGHT FOR THE BIG CITIES (August 15, 1945) TELEGRAM BY CHAIRMAN MAO IN REPLY TO CHIANG KAISHEK (August 16, 1945) CHIANG KAISHEK, THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE, HAS SENT OUT A SIGNAL FOR CIVIL WAR (August 16, 1945) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ZHU [DE] SENDS A TELEGAM DEMANDING THAT CHIANG KAISHEK END THE CIVIL WAR (August 16, 1945) DISPATCH NINE REGIMENTS TO THE THREE EASTERN PROVINCES (August 20, 1945) REPLY TO A TELEGRAM FROM CHIANG KAISHEK (August 22, 1945) THE NEW SITUATION AND NEW TASKS FOLLOWING VICTORY IN THE ANTI JAPANESE WAR (August 23, 1945) TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO CHIANG KAISHEK (August 24, 1945) CURRENT PARTY POLICY AND WORK AGENDA FOR THE NEW FOURTH ARMY (August 24, 1945) DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE CURRENT SITUATION (August 25, 1945) MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CAPTURE MANY MEDIUM-SIZEDAND SMALL CITIES (August 25, 1945) ADDRESS AT THE POLITBURO MEETING BEFORE ATTENDING THE CHONGQING TALKS (August 26, 1945) THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVE ON THE SITUATION, TASKS, AND POLICIES FOLLOWING THE JAPANESE SURRENDER (August 26, 1945) DURING THE PERIOD WHEN MAO ZEDONG ATTENDS THE CHONGQING TALKS, HE WILL BE REPLACED BY LIU SHAOQI IN THE ROLE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (August 27, 1945) CHAIRMAN MAO'S STATEMENT ON ARRIVING IN CHONGQING (August 28, 1945) TALK AT THE OFFICE OF THE EIGHTEENTH ARMY GROUP IN CHONGQING (August 29, 1945) ELEVEN POINTS REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUOMINDANG (August 30, 1945) MAO ZEDONG'S COMMENTS ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES (September 2, 1945) AN INSCRIPTION CELEBRATING VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN (September 3, 1945) TALK WITH DAGONG BAO REPORTERS (September 5, 1945) CHAIRMAN MAO MAKES REMARKS IN CHONGQING EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL COME TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION (September 13, 1945) HASTEN TO SEND PEOPLE TO SHANGHAI AND OTHER PLACES TO ESTABLISH NEWSPAPERS (September 14, 1945) SPEECH AT THE CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE RECEPTION (September 18, 1945) ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY REUTERS NEWS AGENCY CORRESPONDENT CAMPBELL (September 27, 1945) TO LIU YAZI (October 4, 1945) TO LIU YAZI (October 7, 1945) SPEECH AT A PARTY HELD IN THE AUDITORIUM OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION (October 8, 1945) REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS (October 11, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG AND DENG XIAOPING (October 12, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG, DENG XIAOPING, AND CHEN GENG (October 16, 1945) SEIZING VICTORY IN THE PING[HAN]-SUI[YUAN] CAMPAIGN IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE (October 16, 1945) TELEGRAM TO THE COMRADES OF THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF THE SHANXI-HEBEI-SHANDONG-HENAN (JIN-JI-LU-YU) REGION (October 17, 1945) ON THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS (October 17, 1945) REPORT ON THE CCP-KMT NEGOTIATIONS DELIVERED IN THE AUDITORIUM OF THE YAN'AN PARTY SCHOOL (October 17, 1945) TELEGRAM TO CHEN GENG, AND FOR THE INFORMATION OF LIU BOCHENG, DENG XIAOPING, NIE RONGZHEN, AND XIAO KE (October 19, 1945) LOCAL TROOPS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO REPLENISH THE FIELD ARMY (October 19, 1945) THE CURRENT POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHEAST (October 19, 1945) THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS (October 20, 1945) ON THE WARFARE IN SHANDONG AND CENTRAL CHINA (October 22, 1945) ISOLATE AND THEN ANNIHILATE THE FORCES OF FU ZUOYI IN JINING (October 24, 1945) SPEECH AT THE SEVENTH BRANCH SCHOOL OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL UNIVERSITY (October 25, 1945) TRANSFER OUR FORCES TO THE NORTHEAST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE (October 25, 1945) DISPOSITIONS FOR THE PINGHAN CAMPAIGN (October 27, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG AND DENG XIAOPING (October 29, 1945) ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUOMINDANG (October 29, 1945) ZHAO ERLU IS TO PROCEED TO LINCHENG (October 30, 1945) PREPARE TO PIN DOWN WANG ZHONGLIAN'S TROOPS, WHICH MAY MOVE NORTH AS REINFORCEMENTS (October 30, 1945) ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY FACING US AND THEN ATTACK THE REINFORCEMENTS (October 30, 1945) TELEGRAM TO ZHOU ENLAI (October 31, 1945) AMASS THE GREATEST FORCE TO ANNIHILATE THE PRESENT ENEMY (October 31, 1945) RAPIDLY SET OFF FOR THE LINCHENG AREA (October 31, 1945) NOVEMBER OPERATIONAL PREPARATIONS (November 1, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG, DENG XIAOPING, BO YIBO, ZHANG JICHUN, AND LI DA (November 2, 1945) THE PROCESS OF WINNING THE PING-HAN CAMPAIGN (November 2, 1945) METHOD FOR DEALING WITH CAPTURED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS (November 3, 1945) YANG AND SU'S COLUMN SHOULD REPLACE ITS LOSSES AND THEN LEAVE FOR JINZHOU AND SHENYANG (November 3, 1945) THERE IS AMPLE REASON FOR OUR SIDE TO INITIATE A COUNTEROFFENSIVE (November 3, 1945) TELEGRAM TO ZHOU ENLAI (November 3, 1945) NORTH CHINA, THE NORTHEAST, AND OTHER AREAS MUST BE RETURNED TO THE PEOPLE'S SELF-GOVERNANCE (November 3, 1945) GREAT VICTORY IN THE BATTLE OF SELF-DEFENSE BY OUR FORCES IN SOUTHERN HEBEI (November 4, 1945) COMMENCE MILITARY TRANSPORT WORK AGAINST THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST TROOPS (November 4, 1945) DEPLOYMENT TO INCREASE TROOPS IN THE NORTHEAST (November 4, 1945) A CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY SPOKESPERSON DENOUNCES WU GUOZHEN'S SHAMELESS LIES AND PRESENTS IRONCLAD EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REPEATED ATTACKS BY THE GUOMINDANG ARMY (November 5, 1945) THE THREE BIG PROBLEMS OF ACCEPTING SURRENDER, THE PUPPET TROOPS, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE RESTORED (November 5, 1945) INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON LAUNCHING A LARGE-SCALE RENT REDUCTION AND PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN TO WIN THE WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE (November 7, 1945) THE PRESENT ORIENTATION REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND NEGOTIATIONS (November 7 and 8, 1945) TREAT MOBILIZING THE MASSES AND CREATING THE BATTLEFIELD AS THE MOST URGENT STRATEGIC TASKS IN THE NORTHEAST AT PRESENT (November 10, 1945) MAKE CREATING BATTLEFIELDS A STRATEGIC TASK (November 11, 1945) THE SITUATION AFTER THE VICTORY OVER JAPAN AND SOME WORK POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE (November 12, 1945) FIGHTING ON INTERNAL LINES, WIPE OUT THE GUOMINDANG'S THREE ARMIES ONE BY ONE (November 15, 1945) YAN'AN AUTHORITY COMMENTING ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SAYS UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE GUOMINDANG AUTHORITY REVEALS DETERMINATION TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE CIVIL WAR (November 16, 1945) POLICY FOR WORK IN THE LIBERATED AREAS IN 1946 (December 15, 1945) DIRECTIVE OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON WORK IN THE NORTHEAST (December 28, 1945) LETTER TO SITU MEITANG (December 28, 1945) TO HUANG QISHENG (December 29, 1945) 1946 TO CAI BO AND OTHERS (January 8, 1946) NOTICE ON HALTING DOMESTIC MILITARY CONFLICT (January 10, 1946) TO LIU YAZI (January 28, 1946) DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND TASKS (February 1, 1946) THE REACTIONARIES ARE EXPANDING THEIR ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES UNDER THE INSTIGATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GUOMINDANG GOVERNMENT (February 26, 1946) REMARKS AT THE FAREWELL PARTY FOR GENERAL MARSHALL (March 5, 1946) TELEGRAMS REGARDING YE TING'S ADMISSION TO THE PARTY (March 7, 1946) TO HONG YU (March 12, 1946) CIRCULAR REQUESTING THAT ALL AREAS REPORT ON INDUSTRY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT (March 12, 1946) FOUR POINTS IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION (March 15, 1946) PAY STRICT ATTENTION TO POLICY WHEN ENTERING AND GARRISONING AREAS IN THE NORTHEAST (March 17, 1946) CONTROL WITH ALL OUR MIGHT THE TWO CITIES OF CHANGCHUN AND HARBIN AND THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY (March 24, 1946) POLICY ORIENTATION ON THE QUESTION OF INDUSTRY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT (March 24 and 28, 1946) POLICY TOWARD ARMED AND UNARMED GUOMINDANG PERSONNEL (March 30, 1946) TAKE STRICT PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SUDDEN ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY DURING THIS HIGH TIDE OF REACTIONARY ACTIVITY (April 5, 1946) ON COUNTERING LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS IN THE NORTHEAST BY CHIANG KAISHEK AND THE UNITED STATES (April 5, 1946) ACHIEVING VICTORIES IN THE BATTLES AT SIPING AND BENXI IS KEY AT PRESENT (April 6, 1946) SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF ENGAGING IN BATTLE IN THE NORTHEAST (April 8, 1946) SOME PROBLEMS IN CORRECTING ERRORS IN OUR MASS WORK (April 11, 1946) WHEN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHEAST, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE THE WHOLE SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT AND MAKE PLANS FOR THE LONG RUN (April 12, 1946) DEFEND SIPING AND BENXI SO AS TO GIVE US AN ADVANTAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS (April 13, 1946) RAPIDLY DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THE NORTHEAST AND SEIZE THE UPPER HAND BEFORE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (April 15, 1946) ATTACK THE BEIPING-SHENYANG RAILWAY AND CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE NORTH OF SHENYANG (April 16, 1946) YOU ARE EXPECTED TO BE PREPARED TO HANDLE ANY INCIDENT (April 18, 1946) PAYING RESPECTS TO THE MARTYRS WHO DIED ON APRIL 8 (April 19, 1946) MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE NORTHEAST AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF CHANGCHUN (April 19, 1946) CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO LAUNCH SEVERAL LARGE DECISIVE BATTLES SOUTH AND NORTH OF SIPING (April 19, 1946) RAPIDLY TRANSFER TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN MANCHURIA NORTHWARDS TO ENGAGE IN BATTLE; PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO DEFEND THE CITY OF CHANGCHUN (April 20, 1946) MAKE THE UTMOST EFFORT TO SECURE VICTORY IN BATTLE IN THE SIPING AND GONGZHULING AREAS (April 20, 1946) THE CHANGCHUN FORCES SHOULD RAPIDLY DIVIDE INTO CITY GARRISON AND FIELD ARMY UNITS (April 21, 1946) DEPLOYMENT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS TO ANNIHILATE THE NEW FIRST ARMY (April 21, 1946) WE SHOULD TRANSFER MANY OF OUR FORCES NORTHWARD TO DEFEND CHANGCHUN AND CHAHAR (April 21, 1946) OPINIONS ON MILITARY WORK AND LOCAL WORK IN THE NORTHEAST (April 23, 1946) DEFEND BENXI TO THE LAST AND WORK AGAINST TIME UNTIL A CEASEFIRE IS REACHED (April 26, 1946) WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS IN UTILIZING FRESH TROOPS (April 28, 1946) RESOLUTELY DEFEND SIPING AND FOR THE PRESENT DO NOT LAUNCH ANY LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVES (April 30, 1946) TROOPS IN THE CENTRAL PLAINS MILITARY REGION SHOULD ATTEMPT A TRANSFER WITHIN THE RULES OF THE AGREEMENT (April 30, 1946) IMMEDIATELY PREPARE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST THE PINGGU LINE, NANKOU, AND OTHER AREAS (April 30, 1946) SOME POINTS IN APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (April 1946) DIRECTIVE ON THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY TRAINING (May 1, 1946) STRUGGLE RESOLUTELY IN SIPING AND BENXI TO SECURE A PEACE THAT WILL BE FAVORABLE TO US (May 1, 1946) WE AGREE WITH THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL PLAINS BUREAU REGARDING ATTACKS BY THE DIEHARD ARMY (May 2, 1946) STRIKE AT THE ENEMY AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT DURING MOBILE WARFARE (May 3, 1946) KEEPING A HOLD ON BENXI WILL DEMORALIZE THE ENEMY (May 3, 1946) KEEP UP EFFORTS TO DESTROY THE SECTION OF THE RAILWAY BETWEEN JINZHOU AND THE SHANHAI PASS (May 3, 1946) OPINIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN IN REHE (May 3, 1946) VIEWS ON CUTTING OFF THE ENEMY'S LINE OF RETREAT AND SURROUNDING AND ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY IN SIPING (May 4, 1946) MAIN POINTS OF THE SPEECHES BY MAO ZEDONG AND LIU SHAOQI ON LAND POLICY (May 8, 1946) STEP UP PREPARATIONS AGAINST FU ZUOYI'S ATTACKS (May 9, 1946) ATTEND TO OTHER WORK WHILE ARRANGING FOR THE EASTERN REHE CAMPAIGN (May 10, 1946) CUT OFF THE RETREAT OF THE ENEMY ARMY AT SIPING AND PIN DOWN THE ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS AT BENXI (May 12, 1946) QUICKLY SEND TROOPS TO WATCH FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO OCCUPY WESTERN JINZHOU (May 13, 1946) THE GUOMINDANG'S PLOT FOR CIVIL WAR AND OUR COUNTERMEASURES (May 15, 1946) THE VARIOUS FORCES IN REHE ARE EXPECTED TO ACTIVELY COORDINATE WITH OUT ARMY FOR BATTLE IN THE NORTHEAST (May 15, 1946) WE HOPE FOR A STUDY OF TECHNIQUES FOR DESTROYING TANKS (May 18, 1946) FIRMLY DEFEND SIPING, BUT WHEN THIS BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE, ABANDON IT ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE (May 19, 1946) TO NIE RONGZHEN AND WANG JIAXIANG (May 19, 1946) IN THE NORTHEAST, WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED CITIES SHOULD FOR NOW STILL BE GIVEN PRIORITY (May 19, 1946) LOCAL RETALIATION ADOPTED TOWARD ATTACKS BY THE DIEHARD ARMY (May 19, 1946) MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SIPING (May 19, 1946) TO THE XIN'AN TOUR GROUP (May 20, 1946) FOR THE TIME BEING, DO NOT UNDERTAKE BATTLE AT DONGMING (May 21, 1946) OUR POLICY AFTER FORFEITING SIPING (May 21, 1946) LETTER TO YU GUANGSHENG (May 22, 1946) TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO THE TELEGRAM FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE (May 23, 1946) ACTIVELY PREPARE FOR BATTLE AND STRENGTHEN WORK AMONG THE DIEHARD ARMY (May 26, 1946) THE MAIN FORCE IN THE NORTHEAST SHOULD NOT FEAR LOSING TERRITORY AND IT SHOULD PREPARE FOR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE (May 27, 1946) THE BATTLE TO DEFEND SIPING CANNOT REPRESENT OUR GENERAL BATTLE STRATEGY (May 27, 1946) PREPARE TO DEAL WITH THE GUOMINDANG'S OFFENSIVE AGAINST SHANXI-SUIYUAN AND SHANXI CHAHAR-HEBEI (May 27, 1946) MAKE AMPLE PREPARATIONS TO COUNTER THE GUOMINDANG'S LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE (May 29, 1946) PURCHASE TNT IN LARGE QUANTITIES AND EMPHASIZE TRAINING FOR ATTACKING CITIES (May 29, 1946) IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE SHANDONG MILITARY REGION TO FIRST ANNIHILATE THE ARMIES OF WU HUAWEN ET AL. (May 30, 1946) IT IS UNNECESSARY TO GIVE NOTICE BEFORE ATTACKING AND SEIZING TAI'AN AND OTHER PLACES (May 31, 1946) THE UNITED STATES IS TRANSPORTING LARGE NUMBERS OF CHIANG'S TROOPS TO THE NORTHEAST TO EXTEND THE CIVIL WAR (June 1, 1946) THE CENTRAL PLAINS FORCES MUST SEEK THEIR OWN PATH TO SALVATION AND PREPARE TO BREAK OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT (June 1, 1946) FIRST SEIZE TAI'AN AND OTHER CITIES, AND THEN CONSIDER ATTACKING JI'NAN (June 1, 1946) WE AGREE TO ADOPT AN OVERALL POLICY OF MOBILE WARFARE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE NORTHEAST (June 3, 1946) BATTLE DEPLOYMENTS FOR DATONG, KOUQUAN, SHUOXIAN, NINGWU, AND OTHER PLACES (June 4, 1946) INCREASE TROOP STRENGTH, COMPLETELY CONTROL THE LUELIANG REGION (June 4, 1946) PREPARE ALL CONDITIONS FOR USING MOBILE WARFARETO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ATTACKING CHENGDE (June 5, 1946) DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD, THE NORTHEAST TROOPS SHOULD REST AND REORGANIZE, REPLENISH THEIR RANKS, AND BE ON GUARD AGAINST ENEMY RAIDS (June 6, 1946) REST, REORGANIZE, CONSERVE STRENGTH, AND PREPARE TO SHATTER THE ENEMY'S ATTACK (June 6, 1946) FIRST TAKE SHUOXIAN AND NINGWU, THEN TAKE SHANYANG AND DAIYUE; MAKE SURE NOT TO DISTURB FU ZUOYI (June 9, 1946) AUTHORITATIVE PERSON IN YAN'AN DECLARES OPPOSITION TO THE BYRNES BILL TO ASSIST CHIANG KAISHEK (June 16, 1946) TELEGRAM TO ZHENG WEISAN, LI XIANNIAN, AND WANG ZHEN (June 19, 1946) MILITARY DISPOSITIONS FOR DEALING WITH A MAJOR ASSAULT BY CHIANG KAISHEK (June 19, 1946) PREPARE TO CAPTURE NINGWU AND OTHER CITIES (June 20, 1946) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CHENGDE SHOULD BE DEFENDED OR ABANDONED SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (June 21, 1946) STATEMENT OPPOSING THE U.S. BILL TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHIANG KAISHEK (June 22, 1946) STRATEGIC PLANS FOR THE TAIHANG AND SHANDONG REGIONS AFTER THE OVERALL SITUATION HAS FALLEN APART (June 22, 1946) THE NORTHEAST SHOULD PREPARE TO SHATTER CHIANG KAISHEK'S OFFENSIVE WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS FALL APART (June 22, 1946) GIVE PROPER TREATMENT TO GUOMINDANG AND AMERICAN PERSONNEL ON THE MILITARY MEDIATION OPERATIONAL TEAMS (June 22, 1946) WE AGREE THAT THE FORCES FROM THE CENTRAL PLAINS MILITARY REGION SHOULD BREAK OUT IMMEDIATELY (June 23, 1946) FIRST ATTACK PLACES SUCH AS HUAIREN, THEN WATCH FOR A CHANCE TO CAPTURE DATONG (June 23, 1946) REPLY TO THE TELEGRAM FROM THE AMERICAN SAILORS' UNION (June 24, 1946) BREAK OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT BY SEPARATE ROUTES AND PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE MILITARY MEDIATION TEAM (June 25, 1946) TELEGRAM OF APPRECIATION AND SOLICITUDE TO MA XULUN AND OTHERS (June 25, 1946) ALL OF THE GUOMINDANG'S INITIATIVES ARE TO FIGHT; FOR THE TIME BEING THERE IS NO HOPE FOR PEACE (June 25, 1946) BASIC TASKS FOR THE SHANXI-CHAHAR-HEBEI MILITARY REGION FOLLOWING THE GUOMINDANG'S MAJOR ASSAULT (June 28, 1946) UNMASK THE ENEMY AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT (June 30, 1946) THE REACTIONARIES' SCHEMES WILL ULTIMATELY FAIL (June 30 and July 7, 1946) ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE CENTRAL PLAINS MILITARY REGION AFTER BREAKING OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT (July 3, 1946) FIRST FIGHT SEVERAL VICTORIOUS BATTLES ON THE INTERIOR LINES AND THEN SHIFT TO THE EXTERIOR LINES (July 4, 1946) TELEGRAMS IN REPLY TO DISTINGUISHED PERSONAGES OF VARIOUS CIRCLES IN CHONGQING (July 5, 1946) THE TACTICAL ORIENTATION TO BE ADOPTED AFTER ISSUING THE "JULY 7TH" DECLARATION (July 6, 1946) THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND CHIANG IS NOT TO COMPROMISE BUT TO STRUGGLE (July 6, 1946) NOTICE REGARDING STUDY AND PROPAGATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S "JULY 7TH" DECLARATION (July 8, 1946) IF THE GUOMINDANG DOES NOT COMPLETELY AND PERMANENTLY CEASE HOSTILITIES, WE WILL NOT DO SO UNILATERALLY (July 9, 1946) SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTHEAST BUREAU ON THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE NORTHEAST (July 11, 1946) PAY ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING THE DISCIPLINARY EDUCATION OF THE TROOPS (July 12, 1946) THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY SHOULD PIN DOWN THE ENEMY BY FLEXIBLE MOBILE ACTION ON THE EXTERIOR LINES (July 13, 1946) TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF MR. LI GONGPU (July 13, 1946) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY'S SUCCESS IN BREAKING OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT (July 15, 1946) THE STRATEGIC TASK OF THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY IS TO ESTABLISH BASE AREAS BEHIND ENEMY LINES (July 15, 1946) STUDY THE COMBAT METHOD OF CHEN GENG'S ARMY IN AMASSING FORCES TO DESTROY THE ENEMY ONE BY ONE (July 16, 1946) TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF MR. WEN YIDUO (July 17, 1946) DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE DEFEAT OF CHIANG KAISHEK'S OFFENSIVE BY A WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE (July 20, 1946) FIGHT FLEXIBLY AND ESTABLISH BASE AREAS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN HUBEI AND SOUTHERN HENAN (July 24, 1946) TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF MR. TAO XINGZHI (July 25, 1946) IT IS BETTER TO LOSE SOME PLACES THAN TO BE FORCED TO FIGHT (July 30, 1946) TALK WITH ANNA LOUISE STRONG (August 6, 1946) ACTIVELY FIGHT IN THE TAIHANG MOUNTAINS AND EASTERN CHINA TO ASSIST THE CENTRAL CHINA FORCES (August 9, 1946) ARRANGE FOR SEVERAL MORE BATTLES IN CENTRAL JIANGSU (August 13, 1946) DO NOT DEPLOY EQUAL MILITARY STRENGTH IN ALL CAMPAIGNS AND COMBAT (August 22, 1946) LIU AND DENG SHOULD REPLENISH FIFTEEN TO TWENTY REGIMENTS AS A MAIN FORCE (August 25, 1946) STORM AND CAPTURE WEAK POSITIONS AND THEN DISPLACE AND ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY (August 27, 1946) THE BATTLE EXPERIENCE OF THE CENTRAL CHINA FIELD ARMY (August 28, 1946) GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY IN SHANDONG AND CENTRAL CHINA (August 29, 1946) ELIMINATE THE ENEMY'S THIRD DIVISION AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT (August 29, 1946) DRAWING IN CHIANG'S ARMY TO REINFORCE CENTRAL JIANGSU WILL GREATLY BENEFIT THE OVERALL SITUATION (August 31, 1946) LETTER TO XI ZHONGXUN (September 2, 1946) DEPLOY IMMEDIATELY TO DESTROY LIU ZHI'S FORCES (September 3, 1946) ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACTION FOLLOWING ELIMINATION OF THE THIRD DIVISION (September 4, 1946) AFTER THE THIRD DIVISION IS ELIMINATED, FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISPOSE OF THE ENEMY TROOPS NEAR DONGMING (September 5, 1946) DISPATCH LOCAL TROOPS TO HARASS THE BRIGADE ATTACKING SHAN COUNTY (September 5, 1946) THE MAIN FORCE THAT HAS TAKEN PART IN BATTLE SHOULD ASSEMBLE FOR REST AND REORGANIZATION; TROOPS THAT WERE NOT USED SHOULD ANNIHILATE A UNIT OF THE ENEMY FORCES IN DONGMING (September 7, 1946) RESOLUTELY OVERCOME ALL THOUGHTS OF RETREATING; ESTABLISH BASE AREAS BEHIND ENEMY LINES (September 10, 1946) NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE BATTLE EXPERIENCE OF LIU AND DENG'S ARMY (September 13, 1946) ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION REGARDING AMASSING A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE (September 16, 1946) LETTER TO CHEN JINKUN (September 22, 1946) LETTER TO LU DINGYI (September 27, 1946) CHAIRMAN MAO MEETS WITH AMERICAN JOURNALIST STEELE AND ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION (September 29, 1946) LETTER TO FU DINGYI (September 30, 1946) A SUMMARY BY THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON WORK IN JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER OF 1946 (October 1, 1946) ISSUES RELATING TO THE CURRENT WAR SITUATION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS (October 10, 1946) ON THE PROBLEM OF SELECTING STUDENTS TO BE SENT TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE TANKS (October 13, 1946) ASSEMBLE THE FULL FORCES OF THE SHANDONG AND EAST CHINA FIELD ARMIES AND ELIMINATE THE ENEMY MOVING EASTWARD NORTH OF THE HUAI RIVER (October 15, 1946) ADOPT THE METHOD OF BESIEGING A CITY AND DESTROYING THE RELIEF FORCES TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVE STRENGTH (October 24, 1946) THE ENEMY IS STRONG AND WE ARE WEAK, SO WE MUST PREPARE FOR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE (October 25, 1946) EXPAND YOUR FORCES AND MAKE THE CAPTURE OF THE WHOLE OF HAINAN ISLAND YOUR GOAL (October 30, 1946) THE FIGHTING INSIDE THE SHANHAI PASS WILL SOON REACH A TURNING POINT THAT WILL BENEFIT OUR WAR IN THE NORTHEAST (November 1, 1946) CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM TO MARSHAL STALIN CELEBRATING THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET UNION (November 6, 1946) GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WORK IN THE RURAL AREAS OF THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES (November 6, 1946) THE METHOD FOR HANDLING CAPTURED OFFICERS (November 8, 1946) CAMPAIGNS AND TACTICS BOTH REQUIRE CONCENTRATING THE FIGHTING FORCES TO ENSURE VICTORY (November 9, 1946) LETTER TO HE KAIFENG (November 14, 1946) DIRECTIVE ON CHIANG KAISHEK'S REVENT MOVES TO ATTACK YAN'AN AND CONVENE THE "NATIONAL ASSEMBLY' (November 18, 1946) WINNING REQUIRES SUCCESSFULLY FORMING A UNITED FRONT (November 21, 1946) THE OVERALL SITUATION WILL IMPROVE IF THE ENEMY FORCES ADVANCING TO THE NORTH CAN BE ELIMINATED WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO (December 1, 1946) GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR FIGHTING IN THE EASTERN HEBEI AREA (December 4, 1946) CONVERSATION WITH THREE WESTERN JOURNALISTS (December 9, 1946) TELEGRAM TO OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSOCIATIONS IN SIAM (December 22, 1946) FIGHT MORE SMALL BATTLES AND MAKE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVE STRENGTH YOUR OBJECTIVE (December 26, 1946) 1947 CONGRATULATORY SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR (January 1, 1947) STRIVE TO ANNIHILATE THREE TO FOUR BRIGADES IN EACH BATTLE (January 2, 1947) GO ALL OUT TOWARD THE GOAL OF FIGHTING A WAR OF ANNIHILATION (January 5, 1947) CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE INSURRECTION BY THE CENTRAL CHINA DEMOCRATIC ALLIED ARMY (January 8, 1947) ENCIRCLING CITIES AND ATTACKING REINFORCEMENTS ARE AN IMPORTANT WAY TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY (January 11, 1947) TO CHEN JINKUN (January 16, 1947) CAPTURE ZAOZHUANG AND PREPARE TO ELIMINATE OU ZHEN'S FORCES (January 17, 1947) TELEGRAM TO CHEN YI AND SU YU (January 17, 1947) GO ALL-OUT TO ANNIHILATE OU ZHEN'S ARMY AND OPEN A ROUTE TO ADVANCE SOUTH (January 18, 1947) WHEN SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED, ATTACK OU ZHEN AGAIN (January 19, 1947) TO FIGHT OU ZHEN, AMASS FIFTY REGIMENTS ON ONE BATTLEFIELD (January 21, 1947) A SPRING FESTIVAL APPEAL TO CADRES AND RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICTS AND VILLAGES (January 24, 1947) TWO CONDITIONS FOR FIGHTING A LARGE-SCALE BATTLE OF ANNIHILATION (January 25, 1947) THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE TO INCREASE ATTACKS ON THE WEAKER ENEMIES AND ISOLATE THE STRONGER ONES (January 27, 1947) IDEAS ON HOW TO SMASH CHEN CHENG'S ATTACK PLAN (January 28, 1947) WE SHOULD LURE THE ENEMY TO PENETRATE DEEPLY AND FIGHT A MAJOR BATTLE OF ANNIHILATION IN SOUTHERN SHANDONG (January 31, 1947) DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND TASKS (February 1, 1947) SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO THOROUGHLY CRUSH CHEN CHENG'S ATTACK ON SOUTHERN SHANDONG (February 3, 1947) YOU MUST WAIT UNTIL THE ENEMY ENTERS THE TANCHENG-LINYI REGION BEFORE FIGHTING THE FIRST BATTLE (February 4, 1947) ATTACK THE WEAKER ENEMIES FIRST, THEN THE STRONGER ENEMIES; STRIVE FOR AN ADVANTAGE (February 6, 1947) CONSTRUCT DEFENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS IN LINYI TO FACILITATE ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY (February 6, 1947) QUESTIONS ON SETTING OFF FOR LAIWU AND XINTAI TO FIGHT (February 7, 1947) ELIMINATION OF HAO PENGJU'S FORCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE OVERALL STRATEGIC PLAN (February 9, 1947) CARRYING OUT THE JIAOJI CAMPAIGN REQUIRES FULL PREPARATION (February 23, 1947) OUR ARMY'S PLAN OF ACTION FOLLOWING THE LAIWU CAMPAIGN (February 24, 1947) ASSEMBLE THE MAIN FORCES AND RIDE THE CREST OF VICTORY TO CAPTURE THE JIAOJI RAILWAY (February 25, 1947) FACILITATING THE ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY SHOULD BE A CRITERION FOR CONSIDERING BATTLE OPERATIONS (March 6, 1947) THE DEFENSE OF YAN'AN MAINLY DEPENDS UPON FIGHTING ON THE EXTERIOR LINES (March 6, 1947) AN ORDER REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF YAN'AN (March 16, 1947) PREPARE TO FIGHT A SECOND BATTLE AFTER THE FIGHT AT QINGHUABIAN (March 26, 1947) WE AGREE WITH YOUR POLICY AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACTIVELY ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY (March 27, 1947) WE NEED TO SMASH HU ZONGNAN'S ARMY IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN SHAANXI (March 27, 1947) MOVING THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION APPARATUS (March 29, 1947) THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL WORK COMMITTEE IS TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE DIRECTION OF LIU SHAOQI (March 30, 1947) ADOPT THE BATTLE TACTIC OF AMBUSHING FROM THE FRONT AND BOTH FLANKS (April 2, 1947) TEMPORARILY AVOID FIGHTING, CONCEAL YOURSELVES, AND WAIT FOR AN OPPORTUNITY (April 3, 1947) QUESTIONS ON A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE NORTHWEST FIELD OPERATIONS CORPS (April 6, 1947) AFTER RESTING AND REORGANIZING FOR A FEW DAYS, CARRY OUT EXTENSIVE SURPRISE ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY'S REAR (April 8, 1947) CIRCULAR OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORK COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER MATTERS (April 9, 1947) BY WAITING PATIENTLY, WE CAN FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO WIPE OUT THE ENEMY (April 15, 1947) THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATER (April 15, 1947) FIRST HIT THE WEAK, THEN HIT THE STRONG; YOU FIGHT YOUR BATTLES, I'LL FIGHT MINE (April 22, 1947) ARRANGE TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY FORCES THAT MAY FLEE FROM WAYAOBAO (April 26, 1947) WANG SHITAI'S UNIT SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE ENEMY'S FOOD SUPPLY LINES ARE CUT (April 26, 1947) ATTACK WAYAOBAO OR PANLONG ONLY IF YOU HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE (April 30, 1947) WE CAN MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IF WE CAPTURE PANLONG WITHIN A WEEK (May 4, 1947) OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE CAPTURE OF PANLONG (May 4, 1947) AS LONG AS YOU HAVE PATIENCE, THERE IS SURE TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY (May 4, 1947) IS IT POSSIBLE TO FINISH OFF THE ENEMY'S 144TH BRIGADE? (May 5, 1947) IT IS BETTER TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK WHEN THE ENEMY IS DISPERSED AND EXHAUSTED (May 5, 1947) CONCEAL YOURSELVES AND REST AND REORGANIZE BEFORE HEADING FOR GUANZHONG AND LONGDONG (May 5, 1947) DO NOT BE IMPATIENT OR DISPERSE OUR FORCES; LURE THE ENEMY IN DEEP AND SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMBAT (May 6, 1947) SLOW DOWN THE ENEMY'S MOVEMENT AND COVER THE FIGHTING IN QINGHUABIAN (May 6, 1947) ARRANGEMENTS FOR DESTROYING THE FRONTLINE TROOPS IN GU ZHUTONG'S APPARATUS (May 8, 1947) CHIANG KAISHEK'S STRATEGY OF DRIVING OUR ARMY NORTH OF THE YELLOW RIVER WILL COME TO NAUGHT (May 11, 1947) TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO THE TELEGRAM FROM THE INNER MONGOLIA PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (May 19, 1947) OUR COMBAT ORIENTATION IN THE NORTHEAST AND THE SITUATION WITHIN THE PASS (May 20, 1947) GENERAL POLICY FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON THE SHANDONG BATTLEFRONT (May 22, 1947) DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE WESTWARD CAMPAIGN OF THE CHEN [GENG]-XIE [FUZHI] COLUMN (May 24, 1947) THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY HAS PLAYED AN ENORMOUS STRATEGIC ROLE (May 28, 1947) AN AUTHORITATIVE PERSON OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY DISCUSSES THE CURRENT SITUATION (May 30, 1947) WE AGREE THAT LIU AND DENG'S ENTIRE ARMY SHOULD REST AND REORGANIZE, AND CROSS THE RIVER AT THE END OF THE MONTH (June 3, 1947) ALL LARGE-SCALE ACTIONS TO SABOTAGE RAILROADS MUST COME TO A HALT (June 4, 1947) MAKE ALL PREPARATIONS TO SEIZE THE GREAT NORTHWEST (June 6, 1947) JUNE 1947 SHOULD BE THE MONTH IN WHICH TO BEGIN A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERATTACK (June 14, 1947) DO NOT FIGHT BATTLES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOT ASSURED OF VICTORY (June 22, 1947)
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AUGUST 1945 PREPARE TO DEAL WITH THE CIVIL WAR SITUATION THAT IS CERTAIN TO ARISE (August 4, 1945) PREPARE TO JOIN WITH THE FORCES OF WANG ZHEN AND WANG SHOUDAO TO SET UP THE HUNAN-GUANGDONG BORDER BASE AREA (August 4, 1945) TELEGRAM TO MARSHAL STALIN (August 9, 1945) COMRADE MAO ZEDONG MAKES A DECLARATION REGARDING THE FACT THAT THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN HAS ENTERED ITS FINAL STAGE (August 9, 1945) SPEECH AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE SEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (August 9, 1945) THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTIONS REGARDING OUR PARTY'S TASKS AFTER JAPAN'S SURRENDER (August 11, 1945) XINHUA NEWS AGENCY REPORTER CRITICIZES AND CONDEMNS THE "CHIANG KAISHEK ORDER" FOR PROVOKING CIVIL WAR AND FOR DESTROYING WORLD PEACE (August 12, 1945) WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO SEIZE COMMUNICATIONS LINES AND THE CITIES ALONG THOSE LINES (August 12, 1945) REGARDING CENTRAL CHINA'S DEPLOYMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE CIVIL WAR (August 12, 1945) THE SITUATION FOLLOWING THE VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN AND OUR COURSE OF ACTION (August 13, 1945) TELEGRAM FROM COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ZHU [DE] AND DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF PENG [DEHUAI] RESOLUTELY REJECTING CHIANG KAISHEK'S ERRONEOUS ORDER (August 13, 1945) WE DEFINITELY MUST HAVE AN ABSOLUTELY SUPERIOR FORCE DURING CAMPAIGNS; WE CANNOT FIGHT RECKLESSLY (August 13, 1945) EXTENSIVELY OCCUPY THE COUNTRYSIDE, DO NOT FIGHT FOR THE BIG CITIES (August 15, 1945) TELEGRAM BY CHAIRMAN MAO IN REPLY TO CHIANG KAISHEK (August 16, 1945) CHIANG KAISHEK, THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE, HAS SENT OUT A SIGNAL FOR CIVIL WAR (August 16, 1945) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ZHU [DE] SENDS A TELEGAM DEMANDING THAT CHIANG KAISHEK END THE CIVIL WAR (August 16, 1945) DISPATCH NINE REGIMENTS TO THE THREE EASTERN PROVINCES (August 20, 1945) REPLY TO A TELEGRAM FROM CHIANG KAISHEK (August 22, 1945) THE NEW SITUATION AND NEW TASKS FOLLOWING VICTORY IN THE ANTI JAPANESE WAR (August 23, 1945) TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO CHIANG KAISHEK (August 24, 1945) CURRENT PARTY POLICY AND WORK AGENDA FOR THE NEW FOURTH ARMY (August 24, 1945) DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE CURRENT SITUATION (August 25, 1945) MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CAPTURE MANY MEDIUM-SIZEDAND SMALL CITIES (August 25, 1945) ADDRESS AT THE POLITBURO MEETING BEFORE ATTENDING THE CHONGQING TALKS (August 26, 1945) THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVE ON THE SITUATION, TASKS, AND POLICIES FOLLOWING THE JAPANESE SURRENDER (August 26, 1945) DURING THE PERIOD WHEN MAO ZEDONG ATTENDS THE CHONGQING TALKS, HE WILL BE REPLACED BY LIU SHAOQI IN THE ROLE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (August 27, 1945) CHAIRMAN MAO'S STATEMENT ON ARRIVING IN CHONGQING (August 28, 1945) TALK AT THE OFFICE OF THE EIGHTEENTH ARMY GROUP IN CHONGQING (August 29, 1945) ELEVEN POINTS REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUOMINDANG (August 30, 1945) MAO ZEDONG'S COMMENTS ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES (September 2, 1945) AN INSCRIPTION CELEBRATING VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN (September 3, 1945) TALK WITH DAGONG BAO REPORTERS (September 5, 1945) CHAIRMAN MAO MAKES REMARKS IN CHONGQING EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL COME TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION (September 13, 1945) HASTEN TO SEND PEOPLE TO SHANGHAI AND OTHER PLACES TO ESTABLISH NEWSPAPERS (September 14, 1945) SPEECH AT THE CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE RECEPTION (September 18, 1945) ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY REUTERS NEWS AGENCY CORRESPONDENT CAMPBELL (September 27, 1945) TO LIU YAZI (October 4, 1945) TO LIU YAZI (October 7, 1945) SPEECH AT A PARTY HELD IN THE AUDITORIUM OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION (October 8, 1945) REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS (October 11, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG AND DENG XIAOPING (October 12, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG, DENG XIAOPING, AND CHEN GENG (October 16, 1945) SEIZING VICTORY IN THE PING[HAN]-SUI[YUAN] CAMPAIGN IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE (October 16, 1945) TELEGRAM TO THE COMRADES OF THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF THE SHANXI-HEBEI-SHANDONG-HENAN (JIN-JI-LU-YU) REGION (October 17, 1945) ON THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS (October 17, 1945) REPORT ON THE CCP-KMT NEGOTIATIONS DELIVERED IN THE AUDITORIUM OF THE YAN'AN PARTY SCHOOL (October 17, 1945) TELEGRAM TO CHEN GENG, AND FOR THE INFORMATION OF LIU BOCHENG, DENG XIAOPING, NIE RONGZHEN, AND XIAO KE (October 19, 1945) LOCAL TROOPS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO REPLENISH THE FIELD ARMY (October 19, 1945) THE CURRENT POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHEAST (October 19, 1945) THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS (October 20, 1945) ON THE WARFARE IN SHANDONG AND CENTRAL CHINA (October 22, 1945) ISOLATE AND THEN ANNIHILATE THE FORCES OF FU ZUOYI IN JINING (October 24, 1945) SPEECH AT THE SEVENTH BRANCH SCHOOL OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL UNIVERSITY (October 25, 1945) TRANSFER OUR FORCES TO THE NORTHEAST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE (October 25, 1945) DISPOSITIONS FOR THE PINGHAN CAMPAIGN (October 27, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG AND DENG XIAOPING (October 29, 1945) ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUOMINDANG (October 29, 1945) ZHAO ERLU IS TO PROCEED TO LINCHENG (October 30, 1945) PREPARE TO PIN DOWN WANG ZHONGLIAN'S TROOPS, WHICH MAY MOVE NORTH AS REINFORCEMENTS (October 30, 1945) ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY FACING US AND THEN ATTACK THE REINFORCEMENTS (October 30, 1945) TELEGRAM TO ZHOU ENLAI (October 31, 1945) AMASS THE GREATEST FORCE TO ANNIHILATE THE PRESENT ENEMY (October 31, 1945) RAPIDLY SET OFF FOR THE LINCHENG AREA (October 31, 1945) NOVEMBER OPERATIONAL PREPARATIONS (November 1, 1945) TELEGRAM TO LIU BOCHENG, DENG XIAOPING, BO YIBO, ZHANG JICHUN, AND LI DA (November 2, 1945) THE PROCESS OF WINNING THE PING-HAN CAMPAIGN (November 2, 1945) METHOD FOR DEALING WITH CAPTURED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS (November 3, 1945) YANG AND SU'S COLUMN SHOULD REPLACE ITS LOSSES AND THEN LEAVE FOR JINZHOU AND SHENYANG (November 3, 1945) THERE IS AMPLE REASON FOR OUR SIDE TO INITIATE A COUNTEROFFENSIVE (November 3, 1945) TELEGRAM TO ZHOU ENLAI (November 3, 1945) NORTH CHINA, THE NORTHEAST, AND OTHER AREAS MUST BE RETURNED TO THE PEOPLE'S SELF-GOVERNANCE (November 3, 1945) GREAT VICTORY IN THE BATTLE OF SELF-DEFENSE BY OUR FORCES IN SOUTHERN HEBEI (November 4, 1945) COMMENCE MILITARY TRANSPORT WORK AGAINST THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST TROOPS (November 4, 1945) DEPLOYMENT TO INCREASE TROOPS IN THE NORTHEAST (November 4, 1945) A CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY SPOKESPERSON DENOUNCES WU GUOZHEN'S SHAMELESS LIES AND PRESENTS IRONCLAD EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REPEATED ATTACKS BY THE GUOMINDANG ARMY (November 5, 1945) THE THREE BIG PROBLEMS OF ACCEPTING SURRENDER, THE PUPPET TROOPS, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE RESTORED (November 5, 1945) INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON LAUNCHING A LARGE-SCALE RENT REDUCTION AND PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN TO WIN THE WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE (November 7, 1945) THE PRESENT ORIENTATION REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND NEGOTIATIONS (November 7 and 8, 1945) TREAT MOBILIZING THE MASSES AND CREATING THE BATTLEFIELD AS THE MOST URGENT STRATEGIC TASKS IN THE NORTHEAST AT PRESENT (November 10, 1945) MAKE CREATING BATTLEFIELDS A STRATEGIC TASK (November 11, 1945) THE SITUATION AFTER THE VICTORY OVER JAPAN AND SOME WORK POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE (November 12, 1945) FIGHTING ON INTERNAL LINES, WIPE OUT THE GUOMINDANG'S THREE ARMIES ONE BY ONE (November 15, 1945) YAN'AN AUTHORITY COMMENTING ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SAYS UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE GUOMINDANG AUTHORITY REVEALS DETERMINATION TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE CIVIL WAR (November 16, 1945) POLICY FOR WORK IN THE LIBERATED AREAS IN 1946 (December 15, 1945) DIRECTIVE OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON WORK IN THE NORTHEAST (December 28, 1945) LETTER TO SITU MEITANG (December 28, 1945) TO HUANG QISHENG (December 29, 1945) 1946 TO CAI BO AND OTHERS (January 8, 1946) NOTICE ON HALTING DOMESTIC MILITARY CONFLICT (January 10, 1946) TO LIU YAZI (January 28, 1946) DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND TASKS (February 1, 1946) THE REACTIONARIES ARE EXPANDING THEIR ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES UNDER THE INSTIGATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GUOMINDANG GOVERNMENT (February 26, 1946) REMARKS AT THE FAREWELL PARTY FOR GENERAL MARSHALL (March 5, 1946) TELEGRAMS REGARDING YE TING'S ADMISSION TO THE PARTY (March 7, 1946) TO HONG YU (March 12, 1946) CIRCULAR REQUESTING THAT ALL AREAS REPORT ON INDUSTRY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT (March 12, 1946) FOUR POINTS IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION (March 15, 1946) PAY STRICT ATTENTION TO POLICY WHEN ENTERING AND GARRISONING AREAS IN THE NORTHEAST (March 17, 1946) CONTROL WITH ALL OUR MIGHT THE TWO CITIES OF CHANGCHUN AND HARBIN AND THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY (March 24, 1946) POLICY ORIENTATION ON THE QUESTION OF INDUSTRY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT (March 24 and 28, 1946) POLICY TOWARD ARMED AND UNARMED GUOMINDANG PERSONNEL (March 30, 1946) TAKE STRICT PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SUDDEN ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY DURING THIS HIGH TIDE OF REACTIONARY ACTIVITY (April 5, 1946) ON COUNTERING LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS IN THE NORTHEAST BY CHIANG KAISHEK AND THE UNITED STATES (April 5, 1946) ACHIEVING VICTORIES IN THE BATTLES AT SIPING AND BENXI IS KEY AT PRESENT (April 6, 1946) SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF ENGAGING IN BATTLE IN THE NORTHEAST (April 8, 1946) SOME PROBLEMS IN CORRECTING ERRORS IN OUR MASS WORK (April 11, 1946) WHEN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHEAST, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE THE WHOLE SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT AND MAKE PLANS FOR THE LONG RUN (April 12, 1946) DEFEND SIPING AND BENXI SO AS TO GIVE US AN ADVANTAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS (April 13, 1946) RAPIDLY DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THE NORTHEAST AND SEIZE THE UPPER HAND BEFORE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (April 15, 1946) ATTACK THE BEIPING-SHENYANG RAILWAY AND CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE NORTH OF SHENYANG (April 16, 1946) YOU ARE EXPECTED TO BE PREPARED TO HANDLE ANY INCIDENT (April 18, 1946) PAYING RESPECTS TO THE MARTYRS WHO DIED ON APRIL 8 (April 19, 1946) MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE NORTHEAST AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF CHANGCHUN (April 19, 1946) CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO LAUNCH SEVERAL LARGE DECISIVE BATTLES SOUTH AND NORTH OF SIPING (April 19, 1946) RAPIDLY TRANSFER TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN MANCHURIA NORTHWARDS TO ENGAGE IN BATTLE; PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO DEFEND THE CITY OF CHANGCHUN (April 20, 1946) MAKE THE UTMOST EFFORT TO SECURE VICTORY IN BATTLE IN THE SIPING AND GONGZHULING AREAS (April 20, 1946) THE CHANGCHUN FORCES SHOULD RAPIDLY DIVIDE INTO CITY GARRISON AND FIELD ARMY UNITS (April 21, 1946) DEPLOYMENT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS TO ANNIHILATE THE NEW FIRST ARMY (April 21, 1946) WE SHOULD TRANSFER MANY OF OUR FORCES NORTHWARD TO DEFEND CHANGCHUN AND CHAHAR (April 21, 1946) OPINIONS ON MILITARY WORK AND LOCAL WORK IN THE NORTHEAST (April 23, 1946) DEFEND BENXI TO THE LAST AND WORK AGAINST TIME UNTIL A CEASEFIRE IS REACHED (April 26, 1946) WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS IN UTILIZING FRESH TROOPS (April 28, 1946) RESOLUTELY DEFEND SIPING AND FOR THE PRESENT DO NOT LAUNCH ANY LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVES (April 30, 1946) TROOPS IN THE CENTRAL PLAINS MILITARY REGION SHOULD ATTEMPT A TRANSFER WITHIN THE RULES OF THE AGREEMENT (April 30, 1946) IMMEDIATELY PREPARE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST THE PINGGU LINE, NANKOU, AND OTHER AREAS (April 30, 1946) SOME POINTS IN APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (April 1946) DIRECTIVE ON THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY TRAINING (May 1, 1946) STRUGGLE RESOLUTELY IN SIPING AND BENXI TO SECURE A PEACE THAT WILL BE FAVORABLE TO US (May 1, 1946) WE AGREE WITH THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL PLAINS BUREAU REGARDING ATTACKS BY THE DIEHARD ARMY (May 2, 1946) STRIKE AT THE ENEMY AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT DURING MOBILE WARFARE (May 3, 1946) KEEPING A HOLD ON BENXI WILL DEMORALIZE THE ENEMY (May 3, 1946) KEEP UP EFFORTS TO DESTROY THE SECTION OF THE RAILWAY BETWEEN JINZHOU AND THE SHANHAI PASS (May 3, 1946) OPINIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN IN REHE (May 3, 1946) VIEWS ON CUTTING OFF THE ENEMY'S LINE OF RETREAT AND SURROUNDING AND ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY IN SIPING (May 4, 1946) MAIN POINTS OF THE SPEECHES BY MAO ZEDONG AND LIU SHAOQI ON LAND POLICY (May 8, 1946) STEP UP PREPARATIONS AGAINST FU ZUOYI'S ATTACKS (May 9, 1946) ATTEND TO OTHER WORK WHILE ARRANGING FOR THE EASTERN REHE CAMPAIGN (May 10, 1946) CUT OFF THE RETREAT OF THE ENEMY ARMY AT SIPING AND PIN DOWN THE ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS AT BENXI (May 12, 1946) QUICKLY SEND TROOPS TO WATCH FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO OCCUPY WESTERN JINZHOU (May 13, 1946) THE GUOMINDANG'S PLOT FOR CIVIL WAR AND OUR COUNTERMEASURES (May 15, 1946) THE VARIOUS FORCES IN REHE ARE EXPECTED TO ACTIVELY COORDINATE WITH OUT ARMY FOR BATTLE IN THE NORTHEAST (May 15, 1946) WE HOPE FOR A STUDY OF TECHNIQUES FOR DESTROYING TANKS (May 18, 1946) FIRMLY DEFEND SIPING, BUT WHEN THIS BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE, ABANDON IT ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE (May 19, 1946) TO NIE RONGZHEN AND WANG JIAXIANG (May 19, 1946) IN THE NORTHEAST, WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED CITIES SHOULD FOR NOW STILL BE GIVEN PRIORITY (May 19, 1946) LOCAL RETALIATION ADOPTED TOWARD ATTACKS BY THE DIEHARD ARMY (May 19, 1946) MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SIPING (May 19, 1946) TO THE XIN'AN TOUR GROUP (May 20, 1946) FOR THE TIME BEING, DO NOT UNDERTAKE BATTLE AT DONGMING (May 21, 1946) OUR POLICY AFTER FORFEITING SIPING (May 21, 1946) LETTER TO YU GUANGSHENG (May 22, 1946) TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO THE TELEGRAM FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE (May 23, 1946) ACTIVELY PREPARE FOR BATTLE AND STRENGTHEN WORK AMONG THE DIEHARD ARMY (May 26, 1946) THE MAIN FORCE IN THE NORTHEAST SHOULD NOT FEAR LOSING TERRITORY AND IT SHOULD PREPARE FOR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE (May 27, 1946) THE BATTLE TO DEFEND SIPING CANNOT REPRESENT OUR GENERAL BATTLE STRATEGY (May 27, 1946) PREPARE TO DEAL WITH THE GUOMINDANG'S OFFENSIVE AGAINST SHANXI-SUIYUAN AND SHANXI CHAHAR-HEBEI (May 27, 1946) MAKE AMPLE PREPARATIONS TO COUNTER THE GUOMINDANG'S LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE (May 29, 1946) PURCHASE TNT IN LARGE QUANTITIES AND EMPHASIZE TRAINING FOR ATTACKING CITIES (May 29, 1946) IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE SHANDONG MILITARY REGION TO FIRST ANNIHILATE THE ARMIES OF WU HUAWEN ET AL. (May 30, 1946) IT IS UNNECESSARY TO GIVE NOTICE BEFORE ATTACKING AND SEIZING TAI'AN AND OTHER PLACES (May 31, 1946) THE UNITED STATES IS TRANSPORTING LARGE NUMBERS OF CHIANG'S TROOPS TO THE NORTHEAST TO EXTEND THE CIVIL WAR (June 1, 1946) THE CENTRAL PLAINS FORCES MUST SEEK THEIR OWN PATH TO SALVATION AND PREPARE TO BREAK OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT (June 1, 1946) FIRST SEIZE TAI'AN AND OTHER CITIES, AND THEN CONSIDER ATTACKING JI'NAN (June 1, 1946) WE AGREE TO ADOPT AN OVERALL POLICY OF MOBILE WARFARE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE NORTHEAST (June 3, 1946) BATTLE DEPLOYMENTS FOR DATONG, KOUQUAN, SHUOXIAN, NINGWU, AND OTHER PLACES (June 4, 1946) INCREASE TROOP STRENGTH, COMPLETELY CONTROL THE LUELIANG REGION (June 4, 1946) PREPARE ALL CONDITIONS FOR USING MOBILE WARFARETO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ATTACKING CHENGDE (June 5, 1946) DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD, THE NORTHEAST TROOPS SHOULD REST AND REORGANIZE, REPLENISH THEIR RANKS, AND BE ON GUARD AGAINST ENEMY RAIDS (June 6, 1946) REST, REORGANIZE, CONSERVE STRENGTH, AND PREPARE TO SHATTER THE ENEMY'S ATTACK (June 6, 1946) FIRST TAKE SHUOXIAN AND NINGWU, THEN TAKE SHANYANG AND DAIYUE; MAKE SURE NOT TO DISTURB FU ZUOYI (June 9, 1946) AUTHORITATIVE PERSON IN YAN'AN DECLARES OPPOSITION TO THE BYRNES BILL TO ASSIST CHIANG KAISHEK (June 16, 1946) TELEGRAM TO ZHENG WEISAN, LI XIANNIAN, AND WANG ZHEN (June 19, 1946) MILITARY DISPOSITIONS FOR DEALING WITH A MAJOR ASSAULT BY CHIANG KAISHEK (June 19, 1946) PREPARE TO CAPTURE NINGWU AND OTHER CITIES (June 20, 1946) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CHENGDE SHOULD BE DEFENDED OR ABANDONED SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (June 21, 1946) STATEMENT OPPOSING THE U.S. BILL TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHIANG KAISHEK (June 22, 1946) STRATEGIC PLANS FOR THE TAIHANG AND SHANDONG REGIONS AFTER THE OVERALL SITUATION HAS FALLEN APART (June 22, 1946) THE NORTHEAST SHOULD PREPARE TO SHATTER CHIANG KAISHEK'S OFFENSIVE WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS FALL APART (June 22, 1946) GIVE PROPER TREATMENT TO GUOMINDANG AND AMERICAN PERSONNEL ON THE MILITARY MEDIATION OPERATIONAL TEAMS (June 22, 1946) WE AGREE THAT THE FORCES FROM THE CENTRAL PLAINS MILITARY REGION SHOULD BREAK OUT IMMEDIATELY (June 23, 1946) FIRST ATTACK PLACES SUCH AS HUAIREN, THEN WATCH FOR A CHANCE TO CAPTURE DATONG (June 23, 1946) REPLY TO THE TELEGRAM FROM THE AMERICAN SAILORS' UNION (June 24, 1946) BREAK OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT BY SEPARATE ROUTES AND PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE MILITARY MEDIATION TEAM (June 25, 1946) TELEGRAM OF APPRECIATION AND SOLICITUDE TO MA XULUN AND OTHERS (June 25, 1946) ALL OF THE GUOMINDANG'S INITIATIVES ARE TO FIGHT; FOR THE TIME BEING THERE IS NO HOPE FOR PEACE (June 25, 1946) BASIC TASKS FOR THE SHANXI-CHAHAR-HEBEI MILITARY REGION FOLLOWING THE GUOMINDANG'S MAJOR ASSAULT (June 28, 1946) UNMASK THE ENEMY AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT (June 30, 1946) THE REACTIONARIES' SCHEMES WILL ULTIMATELY FAIL (June 30 and July 7, 1946) ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE CENTRAL PLAINS MILITARY REGION AFTER BREAKING OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT (July 3, 1946) FIRST FIGHT SEVERAL VICTORIOUS BATTLES ON THE INTERIOR LINES AND THEN SHIFT TO THE EXTERIOR LINES (July 4, 1946) TELEGRAMS IN REPLY TO DISTINGUISHED PERSONAGES OF VARIOUS CIRCLES IN CHONGQING (July 5, 1946) THE TACTICAL ORIENTATION TO BE ADOPTED AFTER ISSUING THE "JULY 7TH" DECLARATION (July 6, 1946) THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND CHIANG IS NOT TO COMPROMISE BUT TO STRUGGLE (July 6, 1946) NOTICE REGARDING STUDY AND PROPAGATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S "JULY 7TH" DECLARATION (July 8, 1946) IF THE GUOMINDANG DOES NOT COMPLETELY AND PERMANENTLY CEASE HOSTILITIES, WE WILL NOT DO SO UNILATERALLY (July 9, 1946) SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTHEAST BUREAU ON THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE NORTHEAST (July 11, 1946) PAY ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING THE DISCIPLINARY EDUCATION OF THE TROOPS (July 12, 1946) THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY SHOULD PIN DOWN THE ENEMY BY FLEXIBLE MOBILE ACTION ON THE EXTERIOR LINES (July 13, 1946) TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF MR. LI GONGPU (July 13, 1946) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY'S SUCCESS IN BREAKING OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT (July 15, 1946) THE STRATEGIC TASK OF THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY IS TO ESTABLISH BASE AREAS BEHIND ENEMY LINES (July 15, 1946) STUDY THE COMBAT METHOD OF CHEN GENG'S ARMY IN AMASSING FORCES TO DESTROY THE ENEMY ONE BY ONE (July 16, 1946) TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF MR. WEN YIDUO (July 17, 1946) DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE DEFEAT OF CHIANG KAISHEK'S OFFENSIVE BY A WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE (July 20, 1946) FIGHT FLEXIBLY AND ESTABLISH BASE AREAS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN HUBEI AND SOUTHERN HENAN (July 24, 1946) TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF MR. TAO XINGZHI (July 25, 1946) IT IS BETTER TO LOSE SOME PLACES THAN TO BE FORCED TO FIGHT (July 30, 1946) TALK WITH ANNA LOUISE STRONG (August 6, 1946) ACTIVELY FIGHT IN THE TAIHANG MOUNTAINS AND EASTERN CHINA TO ASSIST THE CENTRAL CHINA FORCES (August 9, 1946) ARRANGE FOR SEVERAL MORE BATTLES IN CENTRAL JIANGSU (August 13, 1946) DO NOT DEPLOY EQUAL MILITARY STRENGTH IN ALL CAMPAIGNS AND COMBAT (August 22, 1946) LIU AND DENG SHOULD REPLENISH FIFTEEN TO TWENTY REGIMENTS AS A MAIN FORCE (August 25, 1946) STORM AND CAPTURE WEAK POSITIONS AND THEN DISPLACE AND ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY (August 27, 1946) THE BATTLE EXPERIENCE OF THE CENTRAL CHINA FIELD ARMY (August 28, 1946) GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY IN SHANDONG AND CENTRAL CHINA (August 29, 1946) ELIMINATE THE ENEMY'S THIRD DIVISION AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT (August 29, 1946) DRAWING IN CHIANG'S ARMY TO REINFORCE CENTRAL JIANGSU WILL GREATLY BENEFIT THE OVERALL SITUATION (August 31, 1946) LETTER TO XI ZHONGXUN (September 2, 1946) DEPLOY IMMEDIATELY TO DESTROY LIU ZHI'S FORCES (September 3, 1946) ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACTION FOLLOWING ELIMINATION OF THE THIRD DIVISION (September 4, 1946) AFTER THE THIRD DIVISION IS ELIMINATED, FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISPOSE OF THE ENEMY TROOPS NEAR DONGMING (September 5, 1946) DISPATCH LOCAL TROOPS TO HARASS THE BRIGADE ATTACKING SHAN COUNTY (September 5, 1946) THE MAIN FORCE THAT HAS TAKEN PART IN BATTLE SHOULD ASSEMBLE FOR REST AND REORGANIZATION; TROOPS THAT WERE NOT USED SHOULD ANNIHILATE A UNIT OF THE ENEMY FORCES IN DONGMING (September 7, 1946) RESOLUTELY OVERCOME ALL THOUGHTS OF RETREATING; ESTABLISH BASE AREAS BEHIND ENEMY LINES (September 10, 1946) NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE BATTLE EXPERIENCE OF LIU AND DENG'S ARMY (September 13, 1946) ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION REGARDING AMASSING A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE (September 16, 1946) LETTER TO CHEN JINKUN (September 22, 1946) LETTER TO LU DINGYI (September 27, 1946) CHAIRMAN MAO MEETS WITH AMERICAN JOURNALIST STEELE AND ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION (September 29, 1946) LETTER TO FU DINGYI (September 30, 1946) A SUMMARY BY THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON WORK IN JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER OF 1946 (October 1, 1946) ISSUES RELATING TO THE CURRENT WAR SITUATION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS (October 10, 1946) ON THE PROBLEM OF SELECTING STUDENTS TO BE SENT TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE TANKS (October 13, 1946) ASSEMBLE THE FULL FORCES OF THE SHANDONG AND EAST CHINA FIELD ARMIES AND ELIMINATE THE ENEMY MOVING EASTWARD NORTH OF THE HUAI RIVER (October 15, 1946) ADOPT THE METHOD OF BESIEGING A CITY AND DESTROYING THE RELIEF FORCES TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVE STRENGTH (October 24, 1946) THE ENEMY IS STRONG AND WE ARE WEAK, SO WE MUST PREPARE FOR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE (October 25, 1946) EXPAND YOUR FORCES AND MAKE THE CAPTURE OF THE WHOLE OF HAINAN ISLAND YOUR GOAL (October 30, 1946) THE FIGHTING INSIDE THE SHANHAI PASS WILL SOON REACH A TURNING POINT THAT WILL BENEFIT OUR WAR IN THE NORTHEAST (November 1, 1946) CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM TO MARSHAL STALIN CELEBRATING THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET UNION (November 6, 1946) GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WORK IN THE RURAL AREAS OF THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES (November 6, 1946) THE METHOD FOR HANDLING CAPTURED OFFICERS (November 8, 1946) CAMPAIGNS AND TACTICS BOTH REQUIRE CONCENTRATING THE FIGHTING FORCES TO ENSURE VICTORY (November 9, 1946) LETTER TO HE KAIFENG (November 14, 1946) DIRECTIVE ON CHIANG KAISHEK'S REVENT MOVES TO ATTACK YAN'AN AND CONVENE THE "NATIONAL ASSEMBLY' (November 18, 1946) WINNING REQUIRES SUCCESSFULLY FORMING A UNITED FRONT (November 21, 1946) THE OVERALL SITUATION WILL IMPROVE IF THE ENEMY FORCES ADVANCING TO THE NORTH CAN BE ELIMINATED WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO (December 1, 1946) GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR FIGHTING IN THE EASTERN HEBEI AREA (December 4, 1946) CONVERSATION WITH THREE WESTERN JOURNALISTS (December 9, 1946) TELEGRAM TO OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSOCIATIONS IN SIAM (December 22, 1946) FIGHT MORE SMALL BATTLES AND MAKE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVE STRENGTH YOUR OBJECTIVE (December 26, 1946) 1947 CONGRATULATORY SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR (January 1, 1947) STRIVE TO ANNIHILATE THREE TO FOUR BRIGADES IN EACH BATTLE (January 2, 1947) GO ALL OUT TOWARD THE GOAL OF FIGHTING A WAR OF ANNIHILATION (January 5, 1947) CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE INSURRECTION BY THE CENTRAL CHINA DEMOCRATIC ALLIED ARMY (January 8, 1947) ENCIRCLING CITIES AND ATTACKING REINFORCEMENTS ARE AN IMPORTANT WAY TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY (January 11, 1947) TO CHEN JINKUN (January 16, 1947) CAPTURE ZAOZHUANG AND PREPARE TO ELIMINATE OU ZHEN'S FORCES (January 17, 1947) TELEGRAM TO CHEN YI AND SU YU (January 17, 1947) GO ALL-OUT TO ANNIHILATE OU ZHEN'S ARMY AND OPEN A ROUTE TO ADVANCE SOUTH (January 18, 1947) WHEN SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED, ATTACK OU ZHEN AGAIN (January 19, 1947) TO FIGHT OU ZHEN, AMASS FIFTY REGIMENTS ON ONE BATTLEFIELD (January 21, 1947) A SPRING FESTIVAL APPEAL TO CADRES AND RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICTS AND VILLAGES (January 24, 1947) TWO CONDITIONS FOR FIGHTING A LARGE-SCALE BATTLE OF ANNIHILATION (January 25, 1947) THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE TO INCREASE ATTACKS ON THE WEAKER ENEMIES AND ISOLATE THE STRONGER ONES (January 27, 1947) IDEAS ON HOW TO SMASH CHEN CHENG'S ATTACK PLAN (January 28, 1947) WE SHOULD LURE THE ENEMY TO PENETRATE DEEPLY AND FIGHT A MAJOR BATTLE OF ANNIHILATION IN SOUTHERN SHANDONG (January 31, 1947) DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND TASKS (February 1, 1947) SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO THOROUGHLY CRUSH CHEN CHENG'S ATTACK ON SOUTHERN SHANDONG (February 3, 1947) YOU MUST WAIT UNTIL THE ENEMY ENTERS THE TANCHENG-LINYI REGION BEFORE FIGHTING THE FIRST BATTLE (February 4, 1947) ATTACK THE WEAKER ENEMIES FIRST, THEN THE STRONGER ENEMIES; STRIVE FOR AN ADVANTAGE (February 6, 1947) CONSTRUCT DEFENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS IN LINYI TO FACILITATE ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY (February 6, 1947) QUESTIONS ON SETTING OFF FOR LAIWU AND XINTAI TO FIGHT (February 7, 1947) ELIMINATION OF HAO PENGJU'S FORCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE OVERALL STRATEGIC PLAN (February 9, 1947) CARRYING OUT THE JIAOJI CAMPAIGN REQUIRES FULL PREPARATION (February 23, 1947) OUR ARMY'S PLAN OF ACTION FOLLOWING THE LAIWU CAMPAIGN (February 24, 1947) ASSEMBLE THE MAIN FORCES AND RIDE THE CREST OF VICTORY TO CAPTURE THE JIAOJI RAILWAY (February 25, 1947) FACILITATING THE ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY SHOULD BE A CRITERION FOR CONSIDERING BATTLE OPERATIONS (March 6, 1947) THE DEFENSE OF YAN'AN MAINLY DEPENDS UPON FIGHTING ON THE EXTERIOR LINES (March 6, 1947) AN ORDER REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF YAN'AN (March 16, 1947) PREPARE TO FIGHT A SECOND BATTLE AFTER THE FIGHT AT QINGHUABIAN (March 26, 1947) WE AGREE WITH YOUR POLICY AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACTIVELY ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY (March 27, 1947) WE NEED TO SMASH HU ZONGNAN'S ARMY IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN SHAANXI (March 27, 1947) MOVING THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION APPARATUS (March 29, 1947) THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL WORK COMMITTEE IS TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE DIRECTION OF LIU SHAOQI (March 30, 1947) ADOPT THE BATTLE TACTIC OF AMBUSHING FROM THE FRONT AND BOTH FLANKS (April 2, 1947) TEMPORARILY AVOID FIGHTING, CONCEAL YOURSELVES, AND WAIT FOR AN OPPORTUNITY (April 3, 1947) QUESTIONS ON A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE NORTHWEST FIELD OPERATIONS CORPS (April 6, 1947) AFTER RESTING AND REORGANIZING FOR A FEW DAYS, CARRY OUT EXTENSIVE SURPRISE ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY'S REAR (April 8, 1947) CIRCULAR OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORK COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER MATTERS (April 9, 1947) BY WAITING PATIENTLY, WE CAN FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO WIPE OUT THE ENEMY (April 15, 1947) THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATER (April 15, 1947) FIRST HIT THE WEAK, THEN HIT THE STRONG; YOU FIGHT YOUR BATTLES, I'LL FIGHT MINE (April 22, 1947) ARRANGE TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY FORCES THAT MAY FLEE FROM WAYAOBAO (April 26, 1947) WANG SHITAI'S UNIT SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE ENEMY'S FOOD SUPPLY LINES ARE CUT (April 26, 1947) ATTACK WAYAOBAO OR PANLONG ONLY IF YOU HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE (April 30, 1947) WE CAN MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IF WE CAPTURE PANLONG WITHIN A WEEK (May 4, 1947) OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE CAPTURE OF PANLONG (May 4, 1947) AS LONG AS YOU HAVE PATIENCE, THERE IS SURE TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY (May 4, 1947) IS IT POSSIBLE TO FINISH OFF THE ENEMY'S 144TH BRIGADE? (May 5, 1947) IT IS BETTER TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK WHEN THE ENEMY IS DISPERSED AND EXHAUSTED (May 5, 1947) CONCEAL YOURSELVES AND REST AND REORGANIZE BEFORE HEADING FOR GUANZHONG AND LONGDONG (May 5, 1947) DO NOT BE IMPATIENT OR DISPERSE OUR FORCES; LURE THE ENEMY IN DEEP AND SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMBAT (May 6, 1947) SLOW DOWN THE ENEMY'S MOVEMENT AND COVER THE FIGHTING IN QINGHUABIAN (May 6, 1947) ARRANGEMENTS FOR DESTROYING THE FRONTLINE TROOPS IN GU ZHUTONG'S APPARATUS (May 8, 1947) CHIANG KAISHEK'S STRATEGY OF DRIVING OUR ARMY NORTH OF THE YELLOW RIVER WILL COME TO NAUGHT (May 11, 1947) TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO THE TELEGRAM FROM THE INNER MONGOLIA PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (May 19, 1947) OUR COMBAT ORIENTATION IN THE NORTHEAST AND THE SITUATION WITHIN THE PASS (May 20, 1947) GENERAL POLICY FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON THE SHANDONG BATTLEFRONT (May 22, 1947) DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE WESTWARD CAMPAIGN OF THE CHEN [GENG]-XIE [FUZHI] COLUMN (May 24, 1947) THE CENTRAL PLAINS ARMY HAS PLAYED AN ENORMOUS STRATEGIC ROLE (May 28, 1947) AN AUTHORITATIVE PERSON OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY DISCUSSES THE CURRENT SITUATION (May 30, 1947) WE AGREE THAT LIU AND DENG'S ENTIRE ARMY SHOULD REST AND REORGANIZE, AND CROSS THE RIVER AT THE END OF THE MONTH (June 3, 1947) ALL LARGE-SCALE ACTIONS TO SABOTAGE RAILROADS MUST COME TO A HALT (June 4, 1947) MAKE ALL PREPARATIONS TO SEIZE THE GREAT NORTHWEST (June 6, 1947) JUNE 1947 SHOULD BE THE MONTH IN WHICH TO BEGIN A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERATTACK (June 14, 1947) DO NOT FIGHT BATTLES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOT ASSURED OF VICTORY (June 22, 1947)
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