Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion

Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion

New Essays


Taylor & Francis Ltd






15 a 20 dias


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1. Introduction: Concepts in Thought, Action and Emotion Christoph Demmerling and Dirk Schroeder Part I. Concepts and Experience 2. Concepts and Experience: A Non-Representationalist Perspective Hans-Johann Glock 3. Conceptualism and the Notion of a Concept Hannah Ginsborg 4. Concepts, Belief, and Perception Alex Byrne 5. The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology Eva Schmidt Part II. Concepts and Language 6. Conceptual Thought Without Language? The Case from Animal Cognition Markus Wild 7. Concepts, Normativity, and Self-Knowledge: On Ginsborg's Notion of Primitive Normativity David Lauer 8. A Role for Language in Concept Formation Jasper Liptow 9. Practical Understanding, Concepts, and Language Dirk Schroeder Part III. Concepts and Knowledge-How 10. Concepts and Action: Know-how and Beyond David Loewenstein 11. Knowledge-How and Its Exercises Hannes Worthmann 12. Practical Understanding: Skill as Grasp of Method John Bengson 13. Primary Know-How: Understanding Through Practical Concepts Martin Weichold Part IV. Concepts and Emotion 14. Emotions Inside Out: The Nonconceptual Content of Emotions Christine Tappolet 15. A Challenge to Perceptual Theories of Emotion Jan Slaby 16. Emotions and the Conceptual Space of Human Life Christoph Demmerling
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Markus Wild;Dirk Schroeder;Animal Cognition;Christoph Demmerling;Nonconceptual Content;Hans-Johann Glock;Conceptual Capacities;Hannah Ginsborg;Practical Understanding;Alex Byrne;Violate;Eva Schmidt;Non-conceptual Content;Taylor Carman;Propositional Knowledge;Hannes Worthmann;Vice Versa;John Bengson;Phenomenal Concepts;Martin Weichold;Basic Perceptual Belief;Christine Tappolet;Concept Acquisition;Jan Slaby;Conceptual Thinking;David Laurer;Confer;Markus Wild;Practical Concepts;Jasper Liptow;Brain Body System;concepts;Non-human Animals;action;Recalcitrant Emotions;epistemology;Conceptualist Thesis;philosophy of language;Affective Intentionality;philosophy of emotions;Episodic Emotions;knowledge how;Scrub Jay;practical understanding;Conceptual Phenomena;propositional content;Animal Thoughts;representational content;Conceptual Abilities;experience;sensibility;concept-possession;self-knowledge;primitive normativity;belief;reasons first epistemology;anti-intellectualism;salience;animal cognition;conceptual change;Primitive normativity;Language philosophy;Conceptual thought;Emotions philosophy